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COMMENTS
EVIDENCE-POLICE REGULATION BY RULES OF EVIDENCE-RESULTS OF THE McNABB CASE-In McNabb v. United States 1 the
Supreme Court promulgated novel judicial legislation, the gist of
which is that confessions or admissions of crime made while the accused is in custody without having been brought before a magistrate
as required by law are inadmissible in evidence. That judicial pronouncement assumed that the utterances were made without compulsion, and prohibited their use solely because at the time they were made
the officers of justice were themselves disregarding the law-the procedural re-i_uirement that persons arrested be taken immediately before
a magistrate. In Justice Frankfurter's phrase, "a conviction resting on
evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure
which Congr.ess has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without
1

318 U.S. 332, 63

s. Ct. 608

(1943).
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making the courts themselves accomplices in wilful disobedience of
law." 2
A comment, written shortly after the decision was rendered/ suggested that-ap·art from the vice in any legislation enacted without full
and open consideration of the need and e:ffect thereof-this hasty judicial enactment would result in the evil of confused law enforcement
through uncertainty iri application of the i;ule, and the possible release
upon society of criminals known to be dangerous. That result has now
begun to appear.
In United States v. Klee 4 the defendant had been arraigned within
two hours after his arrest. 5 In the meantime he had freely admitted
his guilt. The trial judge admitted the confession in evidence over
objection, but felt obliged to write a seven page justification because of
the McNabb decision. In United States v. Haupt 6 it appeared that
Haupt had been arrested on a charge.of treason at 5 P.M., June 28.
Early the next morning he made admissions of guilt and made still
others on the day following. For some reason which does not appear
· in the record neither Haupt nor his fellow traitors were arraigned for
some time thereafter. At the trial the use of these admissions was objected to on the ground that they were not voluntary. The jury, however, found that they had been voluntarily made. It appeared also that
the defendants had voluntarily-so the court assumed--signed papers
declaring their "consent to remain under the continuous physical supervision . . . [ of the F .B.I.] without immediate arraignment." 7 :flaupt
w~s convicted and sentenced to death, but the appellate court reversed
the conviction on the ground that the McNabb rule of exclusion applied
.despite the short time which had elapsed between arrest and making of
the admission, and despite the waiver of immediate arraignment. In
:flat conflict with this decision the court in the second circuit held statements which had been made after a waiver of arraignment to be admissible despite the McNabb rule, saying of the Haupt case, "With
all deference we are inclined to think the result reached in United
2 Id. at 345. It now appears that the Court was itself in error as to the fact situation; the McNabbs had actually been "arraigned in timely fashion," though the record
did not so show. Statement of Attorney General Biddle, H. Hearings on H.R. 3690,
78th Cong., 1st sess:, 1943, serial No. 12, p. 29 (1944) (Committee on Judiciary).
These hearings are headed Admission of Evidence in Certain Cases and are dated November 24, December 1, 3, 8, and IO.
3 42 M1cH~ L. REv. 679 (1944).
4 (D.C. Wash. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 679.
5 The bringing of an arrested person before a magistrate for preliminary hearing
is not properly called "arraignment." The term is commonly so mi.sused, however,
and is so used herein merely for brevity.
6 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 661.
7 Id. at 669.
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States v. Haupt was not called for by the decisions of the Supreme
Court. Here each confession was voluntary and neither [because of the
waiver] was in violation of the statutes requiring the defendant to be
taken before a magistrate." 8
Another source of confusion has been the failure of some courts to
distinguish between involuntary confessions, which were held inadmissible long before the McNabb decision, and voluntary statements which
are inadmissible because of the extraneous circumstance of collateral
wrongdoing by the police. This lack of distinction has led to expressed
reliance on the McNabb decision when such reliance was uncalled for
and improper, with resultant apparent, but unreal, approval of its legislation. Thus in Gross v. United States 9 the McNabb case was referr~d
to, but the defendant's confession was declared inadmissible really on the
long established rule that it had been involuntary-"a confession so
pressed from a cell-confined man over a period of five days"; "after
questioning by several investigators for many hours daily over the five
days." 10
Such also was the basis of exclusion in Runnels v. United States 11incriminating statements extracted by repeated questioning over a
period of seventeen days were "not voluntary," hence inadmissible.
Unfortunately, to the confounding of confusion, the opinion adds, "the
case clearly falls within the rules of McNabb v. United States." 12
The question of whether or not the McNabb legislation excludes
voluntary confessions obtained prior to the time when arraignment
should have occurred has also caused more trouble than the mere seven
page opinion of the Klee case, and the problem is now before the Supreme Court. It appears that James Mitchell was suspected of housebreaking and larceny. Police officers took him to the station. Immediately upon arrival there, Mitchell, having been advised of the evidence against him, admitted his guilt. This was obviously before the
permissible time in which to take him before a magistrate had elapsed;
the police were not at all in violation of the procedural law at the time
the confession was made although afterward they did hold Mitchell
for a week without arraignment. At his trial the confession was admitted and he was convicted. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction,18 because of the "far-reaching innovation in the established rules of evidence" promulgated by the McNabb decision. Oddly
enough, however, this court paid no attention to the fact that Mitchell's
United States v. Grote, (C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 140 F. (2d) 413 at 415,
(C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 878.
10 Id. at 880.
11 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 346.
12 Id. at 347.
13 Mitchell v. United States, (C.C.A. D.C., 1943) 138 F. (2d) 426.
8

9
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confession- had neither been obtained by means of police violation of
law nor while they were in disregard of law. Tl,le co;urt gave the later
police wrongdoing an ex post facto effect, far beyond the "innqvation"
of the McNabb decision, which precluded evidence obtained "through"
wrongful police inactivity. The propriety of this circuit court extention
of the McNabb rule is now befor~ the Supreme Court and decision may
be rendered before this present writing appears in print.
In addition to this confusion in its applicatiop., the appalling effect
of the McNabb rule on effective social protection is indicated by records
from the District of Columbia, where, unlike the state agencies, the
police and courts must operate in accord with federal rules. The instances cited are taken from the hearings before the Judiciary Committee of the House.14
Attorney_ General Biddle referred to three specific cases in which
conviction had failed because of the McNabb rule. From police reports
read into the record, other failures in conviction of clearly guilty persons
because of,the new rule are apparent.
"Unquestionably law enforcement has suffered a serious blow
as a result of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
the case of McNabb v. the United States." 15
"After a number of continuances in the criminal branch of the
United States District Court, the case against James E. Smith and
Kelly Artis, charged with robbing William Herbert Carter, was
disposed of on October 6, r943, when a verdict of 'not guilty' was
returned before Chief Justice Eicher, after the Assistant United
States Attorney, Mrs. Grace Stiles, was unable, because of the McNabb decision to introduce the confession made by Smith or his
identification of Kelly Artis. Mrs. Stiles stated that she was unable
to introduce any confession, or allow the arresting officers to take
the stand, or to introduce in evidence the knife and articles recovered from Smith and Artis." iii
Marion Johnson was arrested during the afternoon of October 2 5,
and taken before a magistrate on the 26th, on a charge of stabbing his
wife. At the trial,
·
"The complainant was called and testified, and then the officer
was called to the stand and at this time it was brought out that the
defendant was not. carried before a magistrate Monday, October
25, r943, and the case was then declared a mistrial by Judge
14 H. Hearings on H.R. 3690, 78th.Cong., 1st sess., 1943, serial No. 12, p. 46
ff. (1944) (Committee on Judiciary).
15 ld. at 46 .
. 16 Id. at 50.
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Nathan Margold, as the confession had been admitted as evidence
by the court and should not have been under the N cNabb
ruling." 17
"The petit larceny of the typewriter will be tried in jury court
on December 1, 1943, but inasmuch as the confession was not obtained until the following day, this in all probability will not be
admitted as evidence." 18
A housebreaking and larceny charge; defendant taken to a hospital
after arrest and before being brought before a commissioner.
"Due to the fact that he was not taken before the commissioner
on the day of his arrest it is doubtful that his signed statement and
his admission of the crime will be admitted by the court as evidence." 19
Arrest;d 6:55 A.M., October 22, charged with larceny from Railway Express; admission of guilt 4:45 P.M., October 22; arragined
10:00 A.M., October 23.
"This case was dismissed by the United States Commissioner
due to the fact that the statement was taken before the defendant's
arraignment and there being no other evidence." 20
Arrested morning of October 25 charged with larceny from baggage room; arraigned morning of October 27.
"On November 10, 1943, in jury branch of municipal court,
criminal division, all the above cases were dismissed by Judge
Nathan Margold because of the ruling in the McNabb case." 21
Arrests January 16 "on an open charge"; statement January 1 8,
worth of stolen property recovered; arraigned on charge of larceny January 20.
"On March l 8, 1943, the three cases came up for trial before
Judge Morris in criminal court No. 4. At this time the defense
attorneys raised the point as to whether or not this confession had
been made before or after the three defenctants had been charged
or whether or not the defendants had been brought before a committing magistrate before the confession had been made. My
answer to this question was that the defendants had made the
statements before being charged with grand larceny and that they
$700

17

1d. at
ld. at
19 Id. at
20 Id. at
21
Ibid.

18

51.
52.
53.
54.
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had not been brought before a magistrate. The defense then cited
a recent decision handed down by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Judge Morris interpreted this decision as a ruling,
making such a statement nonadmissible as evidence and directed a
verdict of not guilty. Judge Morris read aloud the main points of
the Supreme Court's decision in open court." 22
"Irving Gunter was indicted by the grand jury on nine counts
of housebreaking, and when brought to trial in the last part of
August, a motion was filed by the defense attorney to suppress
the evidence.• When the case was heard, all evidence was suppressed, and the defendant was _convicted in _one case only-in
which his fingerprints had been found on one of the music boxes
inside the Royale Tavern." 23
"Subject was held 3 days so that the fugitive. squad could investigate· his status in Georgia and also for the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to investigate his draft status. It was subsequently
brought out that the subject was a fugitive from the State of
Georgia. Subject was indicted by the grand jury on November
I 5, I 943 for unauthorized use of auto.
"In the light of recent rulings, the fact that this d~fendant
was held 3 days may cause case to be dismissed when he appears
for trial on the indictment." 24
In addition to these instances of actual or prospective release of
obvious criminals, the police reports are filled with instances of ineffective social protection resulting from the feeling of obligation to
"immediate" arraignment.25
This raises a qu~tion--quite different from that of the consequence
of failure to arraign-as to whether arraignment should be required
. "immediately," or "within reasonable time." That is a problem in and
of itself, demanding careful consideration and study of all discoverable
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
24 Id. at 60.
22
23

25 E.g., "One of the interpretations of the McNabb case is to the effect he must
be ~rraigned immediately but the instance case was dismissed because the stolen property was not produced-in court. Had detective Kite left Leftwich until he located the
stolen property he might not have been able to arraign Leftwich until Monday." Id.
at 55.
"Attention is invited to the fact other crimes and misdemeanors had been reported
in the same locality but same could not be properly investigated due to the fact White,
alias Butler, alias Allen, had to be produced in police qiurt November 25, 1943; to
conform to the op.inion rendered in the McNabb case." Id. at 56.
"The necessity of taking these defendants before the Commissioner and their
subsequent release on bond did not give us ample time to completely investigate this
case or have the defendants viewed by victims of similar robberies." Id. at 52.
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facts. It is not, however, directly involved in the judicial rulings that
evidence obtained between arrest and arraignment is inadmissible. A
combination of rules to the effect that arraignment need be only within
a reasonable time and that evidence is inadmissible only if obtained
after arraignment should have been held ( which latter appears to
have been the real, but subsequently misinterpreted, decision of the
McNabb case) might reduce the evil of the new inadmissibility rule.
But not even that combination would cure the evil; known dangerous
criminals would still be turned loose on society by the courts merely
because the police had also misbehaved; society would still be compelled to suffer doubly. In the committee hearings concerning the
Hobbs Bill,26 several participants assumed that to repudiate the McNabb rule and concede the admissibility of evidence obtained during
delay in bringing the accused before a magistrate would be tantamount
to repeal of the law requiring immediate, or even reasonably prompt,
arraignment. Such an assumption is a logical absurdity, the product of
a peculiar defeatist attitude concerning law enforcement. Turning
criminals loose on society when the police misbehave is a fantastic
method of persuading the police to behave. Were the judiciary half so
astute in compelling observance of the requirement of prompt arraignment by direct action against the offending police officials themselves
as they are ready in releasing other offenders, they could compel respect for the law without sacrificing social safety.
John B. Waite*

26 R.R. 3690, 78th Cong., 1st sess., I 943, provides "That no failure to observe
the requirement of law as to the time within which a person under arrest must be
brought before a magistrate, commissioner, or court shall render inadmissible any
evidence that is otherwise admissible." Quoted· from H. Hearings on R.R. 3690,
78th Cong., 1st sess., 1943, serial No. I 2, p. I ( 1944) (Committee on Judiciary).
Professor of Law, University of Michigan-Ed.
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